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 Note on Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in matrix games Bull. Korean Math. Soc. 2012 Vol. 49, No. 6, 1251-1254 https://doi.org/10.4134/BKMS.2012.49.6.1251Published online November 30, 2012 Weidong Ma Chinese Academy of Sciences Abstract : Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a sufficient condition'' for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples. Keywords : pure-strategy equilibrium, matrix game, saddle point MSC numbers : 91A05 Downloads: Full-text PDF